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Abstract: Recent research finds that firms characterized by high corporate transparency have a 
greater proportion of independent directors. The direction of the causality of this relation, 
however, is unclear. One branch of the governance literature takes corporate transparency as 
fixed and shows that the effective level of board independence is determined by exogenous 
variation in the information environment. Another branch argues that independent directors can 
instigate changes in transparency. We examine a regulatory shock that substantially increased 
board independence for some firms, and find that information asymmetry, and to some extent 
management disclosure and financial intermediation changed at firms affected by this shock. We 
also examine the lead/lag relation between changes in board structure and changes in corporate 
transparency, as well as whether these effects vary as a function of management entrenchment, 
information processing costs, and when changes to audit committee independence are required. 
Our results suggest that corporate transparency can be altered to suit the informational demands 
of a particular board structure.     
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1. Introduction 
We examine whether firm transparency adjusts to an increase in the proportion of 
independent directors. Independent directors, as outsiders to the firm, must acquire and process a 
substantial amount of firm-specific information to effectively perform their advising and 
monitoring duties. When the corporate information environment is opaque, and there are 
significant costs to acquire and process detailed information about their firm’s operating, 
financing, and investing activities, independent directors are less effective. Further, management 
has a fiduciary responsibility to keep both independent directors and shareholders informed 
about the firm’s activities and management’s performance, and this transparency can be impaired 
when boards are dominated by insiders. We document that corporate transparency, as measured 
by proxies for information asymmetry, disclosure, and information intermediation, generally 
improves following a required increase in the proportion of independent directors. We also 
examine the lead/lag relation between changes in board structure and changes in corporate 
transparency, as well as whether these effects vary as a function of management entrenchment, 
information processing costs, and when changes to audit committee independence are required. 
When interpreted in the context of existing literature, our results highlight simultaneity in the 
evolution of board structure and corporate transparency, and suggest that transparency can be 
altered to suit the informational demands of a particular board structure.  
A growing literature documents that a firm’s information asymmetry and transparency 
influence attributes of its board structure in general, and the degree of independence in particular. 
This literature argues that independent directors have difficulty performing their advising and 
monitoring roles when information asymmetry and information transfer and processing costs are 
high, and therefore that firms with high information asymmetry choose to have relatively few 
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independent directors (e.g., Linck et al., 2008; Lehn et al., 2008). Consistent with this prediction, 
several recent papers find a negative relation between board independence and both information 
asymmetry and information transfer costs.1 These papers, however, generally assume that 
corporate transparency is exogenous with respect to board structure. That is, these studies do not 
consider that managers and directors may be able to lower information transfer costs by 
committing to various financial reporting and disclosure policies.2 If corporate transparency is 
endogenous in this way, then the interpretation of a negative relation between information 
asymmetry and board independence becomes more complicated (and may stem from board 
structure influencing information asymmetry as well as information asymmetry influencing 
board structure). 
The notion that a firm’s board structure, including its proportion of independent directors, 
can influence various aspects of corporate transparency is not new, at least within the literature 
on financial reporting and disclosure. For example, Petra (2007) and Ferreira et al. (2011) 
document positive relations between the proportion of independent directors and accounting 
quality and earnings informativeness, respectively. Similarly, Beekes, Pope, and Young (2004) 
and Ahmed and Duellman (2007) find that timely recognition of losses (a commonly used 
measure of earnings quality) is greater for firms with a higher proportion of independent 
directors.3 These authors generally interpret these results as being consistent with independent 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Boone et al. (2007); Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2007); Linck et al. (2008); Lehn et al. (2008); 
Cai, Liu, and Qian (2009); and Ferreira, Ferreira, and Raposo (2011). 
2 Ferreira, Ferreira, and Raposo (2011) examine how stock price informativeness affects board independence. As a 
sensitivity analysis, they consider the possibility that price informativeness and board structure might be jointly 
determined, and estimate two- and three-stage least squares regressions to ensure that their results are robust to 
controlling for potential reverse causality. The focus of this analysis, however, is on controlling for the reverse 
causality effect, as opposed to exploring its existence and characteristics.   
3 In a related vein, Klein (2002) and Krishnan (2005) find that the proportion of independent audit committee 
directors is negatively related to the magnitude of discretionary accruals and the incidence of internal control 
weaknesses, respectively. Goh, Ng, and Yong (2011) examine the cross-sectional association between board 
independence, accruals quality, management forecasts, analyst coverage, and information asymmetry. They address 
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directors improving the quality of financial reporting, although as we note in Section 2, these 
papers generally do not provide evidence on the causality of this relation. 
These two literatures suggest different directions of causality in the relation between 
board structure and corporate transparency. One literature argues that corporate transparency and 
information transfer and processing costs are primarily exogenous, and are dictated by firm 
characteristics such as size, growth opportunities, and business environment uncertainty. As 
such, board independence is, in part, a function of these exogenous firm characteristics. The 
other literature argues that independent directors can take actions to increase their firm’s 
transparency because lower information asymmetry can aid independent directors in reducing 
agency conflicts that arise from managers’ informational advantage. A variant of this argument is 
that managers commit to more transparent financial reporting and disclosure practices to attract 
independent directors, and to make those directors more effective.4 Thus, these competing, non-
mutually exclusive, arguments leave open the question of whether corporate transparency is an 
exogenous determinant of board structure, or instead whether independent directors (or 
managers, or even regulators) can actively induce changes in corporate transparency, thereby 
altering the efficacy of certain board structures. 
To provide more definitive evidence of whether firms’ information environments adapt to 
fit the informational needs of a particular board structure, we examine a shock to the proportion 
of independent directors, and then observe whether and how these firms’ information 
environments change in response to this shock. Similar to Duchin, Matsusaka, and Ozbas (2010), 
we use regulations issued in 2003 by the NYSE and Nasdaq as an exogenous event that 
                                                                                                                                                             
the endogeneity of board independence by using board connections, which they define as “the fraction of dependent 
directors with board connections to boards with a majority of independent directors” as an instrumental variable. 
4 See Engel (2005) for a similar argument in the context of firms committing to high quality financial reporting to 
attract financial experts to the audit committee of the board of directors. 
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significantly altered the proportion of independent directors for some firms’ boards.5 These 
regulations require most listed corporations to have a majority (more than 50%) of independent 
directors on their boards. In general, firms were required to comply with these regulations by the 
earlier of: (1) the listed firm’s first annual shareholder meeting after January 15, 2004; or (2) 
October 31, 2004. Some firms already had a majority of independent directors on their boards 
and therefore complied with these new regulations at the time they were issued; other firms did 
not. In our sample, the firms that were not in compliance with the majority board independence 
rule (as of 2000) have a 45% increase in the mean proportion of independent directors, whereas 
firms that were already in compliance experienced virtually no change in their proportion of 
independent directors during the same period. We use a model of board structure to identify the 
expected change in proportion of independent directors based on the minimum change that firms 
would have to make to their board structure, if any, to comply with the exchange requirements. 
We then use the predicted change in the proportion of independent directors (over a four-year 
period from roughly 2000-2004) to identify the effect of this exogenous change in board 
structure on changes in a variety of information-related variables.  
Using board structure data for a broad sample of 1,849 firms, we find that information 
asymmetry, measured as the information asymmetry component of the bid-ask spread, decreases 
in response to an exogenous increase in the proportion of independent directors. The typical 18 
percentage point average increase in the proportion of independent directors translates to roughly 
a 6% decrease in information asymmetry. We also explore some of the potential channels 
through which transparency may be altered to satisfy the informational demands of the board. 
Specifically, we examine variables related to management forecast frequency and precision, 
accrual quality, analyst following and consensus, shareholder base, and auditor fees. Our 
                                                 
5 Duchin et al. (2010) use the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) regulation related to audit committee independence.  
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evidence suggests that an increase in the proportion of independent directors results in increases 
in the frequency of management forecasts and analyst following (with marginally significant 
evidence of increases in management forecast precision, analyst forecast consensus, and 
institutional following). We also find that auditor fees, a proxy for commitment to stringent 
internal controls and higher quality financial reporting are somewhat greater for firms that are 
required to increase the independence of both their full board and their audit committee.   
We also explore several predictions regarding cross sectional variation in the relation 
between increases in board independence and corporate transparency. For example, although a 
board with a majority of independent directors likely requires a more transparent information 
environment than an insider-dominated board to govern effectively, management may not 
willingly relinquish their control over the board. One way for management to limit the 
monitoring effectiveness of independent directors—particularly those who are new—is to 
withhold information or otherwise resist efforts by directors to elicit increased transparency. To 
explore this possibility, we test whether the increase in corporate transparency is muted for firms 
where managers are likely to be entrenched. Using insider ownership and the proportion of 
independent directors appointed during the current CEO’s tenure as proxies for entrenchment, 
we find that when management is likely to be entrenched, management forecasts become less 
precise, and to some extent less frequent, following the mandated increase in board 
independence. However, we find no significant mediating effects of management entrenchment 
on the relations between the change in board independence and changes in our other measures of 
corporate transparency.  
Our other cross-sectional analyses examine whether the relation between increases in 
board independence and corporate transparency varies with audit committee independence, 
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information processing costs, and whether firms operationalize their compliance with the board 
structure regulations by adding new independent directors (increasing board size) as opposed to 
removing non-independent directors (decreasing board size). Our findings indicate that 
information asymmetry declines more for firms that increase their board size (by adding new 
independent directors), as well as for firms that are required to simultaneously increase the 
independence of their audit committee. 
Finally, we explore the lead/lag relation between changes in transparency and changes in 
board independence. We partition our sample of non-compliant firms into those that complied 
early and late in the sample period, and find some evidence consistent with improvements in 
transparency both preceding and following compliance with the board independence regulation.  
Collectively, our results suggest that firms can and do alter certain aspects of corporate 
transparency to facilitate the informational demands of independent directors. These results 
generally support the inferences in a large body of financial reporting and disclosure literature 
arguing that corporate transparency is endogenous with respect to management and/or board 
actions. At the same time, our findings also highlight the importance of acknowledging the 
simultaneous relation between board independence and corporate transparency, and we suggest 
that caution be exercised when interpreting results that take board independence or corporate 
transparency as exogenous rather than both being jointly and simultaneously determined.      
The paper proceeds as follows: In section 2, we discuss background literature and 
develop predictions on the relations between board independence and corporate transparency. 
Section 3 outlines our research design, and section 4 provides information on our sample 
construction. We present our results in section 5. Section 6 provides concluding remarks.    
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2. Background and Predictions 
As noted above, many authors predict and find a positive relation between corporate 
transparency and the proportion of independent directors.6 This relation is interpreted as 
evidence that firms structure their boards with a high proportion of independent directors only 
when their information environment is sufficiently transparent to allow these directors to perform 
their monitoring and advising duties.7 An assumption that is maintained throughout this literature 
is that corporate transparency is exogenous with respect to firms’ choice of board structure; that 
is, a firm’s board structure is a function of its information environment, but a firm’s information 
environment is not affected by its board structure. In contrast, much of the accounting literature 
on governance assumes that boards and managers can and do make financial reporting and 
disclosure choices to alter corporate transparency. In these papers, the board is often viewed as a 
mechanism that can be used to effect changes in transparency. This research, however, does not 
test for a causal effect of board structure on transparency, and most of the results in this literature 
are also consistent with a reverse causality explanation that the degree of corporate transparency 
drives board structure.     
Our objective is to determine whether and how corporate transparency adapts to the 
informational demands of a particular board structure. As we discuss in more detail below, our 
research design relies on new regulations that mandated substantial increases in the proportion of 
independent directors for some firms but not others. Specifically, the regulations require that 
most boards have a majority of independent directors. Therefore, boards with a majority of inside 
                                                 
6 E.g., Boone et al. (2007); Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2007); Linck et al. (2008); Lehn et al. (2008); Cai, Liu, and 
Qian (2009); and Ferreira, Ferreira, and Raposo (2011). 
7 As noted by Bushman et al. (2004), one might alternatively predict a negative relation between transparency and 
the proportion of independent directors if the monitoring activities of independent directors are more valuable in 
settings where substantial information asymmetries exist between managers and investors. This negative relation, 
however, does not appear to be borne out in the data examined in prior studies.   
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or non-independent directors were required to add more independent directors, remove some 
inside directors, or some combination of the two. Boards with a majority of independent 
directors when the regulations were issued were not required to make changes to their board 
structure. In our sample, firms that were not in compliance with the majority board independence 
rule experience significant increases in their proportion of independent directors, whereas firms 
that were already in compliance do not, on average, increase their proportion of independent 
directors.  
Our main hypothesis is that an exogenous increase in the proportion of independent 
directors will cause an increase in corporate transparency. This hypothesis is premised on the 
idea that independent directors require a transparent information environment to effectively 
monitor and advise management. In some cases, management may proactively increase 
transparency in order to attract independent directors who would otherwise be unwilling to join 
the board if the information environment were opaque. Alternatively, if transparency has not 
been adequately increased to satisfy the informational needs of independent directors, then when 
the proportion of independent directors increases, the board is expected to take action to ensure 
transparency. Thus, although we predict a positive relation between changes in transparency and 
changes in board independence, our analysis considers the possibility that the change in 
transparency may either lead or follow the change in board independence. If corporate 
transparency cannot be altered to accommodate the information demands of an independent 
board, then there should be no association between an increase in the proportion of independent 
directors and changes in transparency. 
We emphasize that our predictions and tests focus on public measures of corporate 
transparency. One might question whether independent directors could instead resolve their 
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information disadvantage vis-à-vis management using private rather than public channels. For 
example, independent directors have access to internal budgeting information, reports, and 
informal communication with managers. It seems unlikely, however, that outside directors rely 
solely on information supplied by, and filtered through, managers (Adams, Hermalin, and 
Weisbach, 2010; Armstrong, Guay, and Weber, 2010). Although managers will be forthcoming 
in sharing certain types of information with independent directors, they are not likely to share 
information that is detrimental to their own interests (Jensen, 1993; Verrecchia, 2001). Thus, 
managers are expected to be forthcoming only with information that is relatively unhelpful to 
independent directors with monitoring.   
In light of this concern, independent directors seek financial reporting systems and public 
information channels that aid their monitoring activities. Bushman et al. (2004) note that public 
disclosures can carry greater credibility than private communications, in part because these 
disclosures are subject to SEC rules and enforcement, litigation, and oversight by auditors and 
others. Information intermediaries such as analysts and the business press scrutinize public 
disclosures. Analysts can also uncover distortions in information (e.g., Miller, 2006). Other 
governing entities, such as blockholders and institutional investors use public disclosures in 
monitoring managers’ strategic decisions. Further, because publicly-released erroneous 
information imposes costs on managers, public information channels enhance the credibility of 
private information that managers share with directors. For example, a public management 
forecast of earnings enhances the credibility of non-public budgets that underlie the forecast. We 
conclude from these arguments and prior literature that public measures of corporate 
- 10 - 
 
transparency are likely to play an important role in governance.8  
Returning to our hypotheses, we note that certain economic forces could complicate our 
prediction of a positive relation between changes in board independence and changes in 
transparency. One issue is that when decision rights are taken away from management and inside 
directors (because the previous majority of inside directors is required to be reduced to a 
minority), managers may respond by thwarting any attempt to increase transparency, or even 
actively decreasing transparency. As noted by Holmstrom (2005), Adams and Ferreira (2007), 
and others, if management believes that a more independent board will monitor their actions and 
decisions more intensively, they may be reluctant to disclose information that can be used for 
disciplining purposes. Further, management may not only withhold information from 
independent directors, but may also seek to entrench themselves by investing in manager-
specific projects that increase information asymmetries and limit the board’s ability to impose 
discipline (see Shleifer and Vishny, 1989; Edlin and Stiglitz, 1995). We expect that 
management’s ability to resist the information demands of independent directors increases with 
the degree to which management is entrenched. In our tests below, we explore this prediction 
using inside ownership and the proportion of independent directors that have been appointed 
during the current CEO’s tenure as proxies for managerial entrenchment.     
Further, managers’ ability to withhold information, and the difficulty with which 
independent directors can elicit information, is expected to be greater when information 
processing costs are large. The influence of information processing costs on board structure is 
discussed in detail by Duchin et al. (2010) who emphasize, “when an outsider’s cost of acquiring 
information about the firm is high, outside directors are less effective at monitoring and 
                                                 
8 Outside directors also have reputations to protect, and public revelation of accounting fraud and misstatements can 
result in large costs in terms of lost directorships (Gerety and Lehn, 1997; Srinivasan, 2005; Fich and Shivdasani, 
2007).  
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providing advice, than when the cost of information is low.” Duchin et al. (2010) further note 
that because some firms optimally maintain a low proportion of independent directors (e.g., due 
to high information processing costs), a mandate that all boards have a majority of independent 
directors is unlikely to be equally beneficial for all firms. And, if the required increase in board 
independence does not result in a more effective board structure, then any improvement in 
corporate transparency following the regulation may be muted. Further, it is possible that 
transparency could even decrease in this latter setting if independent directors make worse 
project selection decisions due to a lack of necessary information, and uncertainty about the 
outcome of these decisions leads to greater information asymmetry. This prediction of a muted 
improvement in transparency when information processing costs are high complements our 
previous prediction that when control is relinquished to independent directors, high information 
processing costs may afford managers an increased ability to withhold information and maintain 
effective control of decision making. In the terminology of Aghion and Tirole (1997), even 
though “formal authority” (i.e., “the right to decide”) may have shifted to the board as a result of 
the regulatory mandated increase in independence, “real authority” (i.e., “the effective control 
over decisions”) may still reside with management due to their information advantage.   
In summary, the discussion above suggests that the effect of a required increase in the 
proportion of independent directors on corporate transparency and information asymmetry is an 
empirical issue: independent directors require greater transparency to govern effectively, but 
managers have incentives to decrease transparency when they are stripped of their formal control 
rights. The discussion also predicts that any positive relation between a required increase in the 
proportion of independent directors and corporate transparency will be attenuated for firms that 
are characterized by greater information processing and transfer costs. In our tests below, we 
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explore whether the relation between a required increase in the proportion of independent 
directors and corporate transparency varies with proxies for managerial entrenchment and 
information processing costs.  
 
3. Research Design and Caveats 
3.1 Research design and caveats 
 We wish to test whether a firm’s proportion of independent directors causally determines 
characteristics of corporate transparency. Therefore, we would ideally estimate the following 
specification:  
Information Variable = a0 + a1% Ind. Directors + ∑ a2*Controls + error      (1)   
However, as discussed in the previous section, the literature on the relation between firms’ 
governance structures and transparency suggests that board structure and information are jointly 
determined. If firms’ % Ind. Directors is endogenously related to corporate transparency, the 
estimated effect of board structure will be biased. Credible identification of the effect of firms’ 
board structure on transparency therefore requires an instrument that produces exogenous 
variation in board structure, but that has no direct effect on firms’ transparency.  
Similar to Duchin et al. (2010), we use recent regulations that imposed changes to board 
structure as a source of exogenous variation in board structure.9 Specifically, we use NYSE and 
Nasdaq regulations that require listed corporations to have a majority (more than 50%) of 
independent directors on their boards. As discussed in Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009), in 
                                                 
9 A number of recent papers also rely on the 2003 NYSE and Nasdaq regulations (or some variant) as an instrument 
with which they have documented causal effects of board structure on firm value (Wintoki, 2007; Duchin et al., 
2010), CEO compensation (Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2009), credit risk (Chen, 2011) and earnings management 
(Chen et al., 2011). In addition, Black and Kim (2012) use Korean regulations that are analogous to the NYSE and 
Nasdaq exchange regulations to examine the relation between board structure and firm value in a sample of Korean 
firms. Collectively, the results in these studies suggest that exchange regulations requiring a majority of independent 
directors are a powerful instrument that have induced a number of empirically detectable effects. 
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February 2002, the SEC asked the exchanges to improve their governance listing standards. The 
NYSE and the Nasdaq proposed the changes requiring majority independence in August 2002 
(NYSE) and October 2002 (Nasdaq), and the SEC approved the proposals with minor changes in 
November 2003. To ensure that our sample period begins prior to any influence of these 
regulation (or public/private discussion about the pending influence of the regulations), we 
measure initial board independence as of fiscal years ending between May 2000 and June 2001. 
About 30% of our sample did not initially comply with this regulation as of 2000, so our sample 
contains firms that had to change their board structure and other firms for which no change was 
required. In general, firms were required to adopt these policies by the earlier of: (1) the listed 
issuer's first annual shareholder meeting after January 15, 2004; or (2) October 31, 2004.10 It is 
important to note that exchange regulations produced variation in the change in the proportion of 
independent directors, rather than in the proportion of independent directors per se.  
To use this instrument, we take first-differences of Eq. (1), which yields the following 
model of changes in information variables as a function of changes in board structure and 
changes in controls: 
Change in Information Variable = a0 
  +a1*Change in % Ind. Directors + ∑ a2*Change in Controls + error        (2) 
 
Change in %Independent Directors remains endogenous, and we instrument for it with its 
predicted value from the following regression:   
Change in %Independent Directors2000-2004 = b0 + b1*Min % Change ID2000  
+ ∑ b2*Change in Controls + industry indicators + error    (3) 
                                                 
10 Firms with classified boards had until their first annual meeting after January 15, 2005, but no later than 
December 31, 2005 (Securities and Exchange Commission press release 34–48745, November 4, 2003).  
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This equation models the change in the proportion of independent directors at each firm between 
2000 and 2004, and identifies it with the instrument, the minimum required percentage change in 
independent directors, Min % Change ID. We calculate this variable as follows: 
Min % Change ID = 0 if % independent directors in 2000 > 50% 
Min % Change ID = (Minimum number of independent directors required for majority 
independence)/board size if % independent directors in 2000 ≤ 50% 
This variable measures the percentage by which firms as of 2000 had to increase their 
independent directors to comply with the 2003 NYSE and Nasdaq regulations that require more 
than 50% independent directors. The regulations affect firms with small boards more than large 
boards, and the construction of our variable captures this effect. For example, consider two 
boards, one with five directors and the other with twenty. If both boards have 40% independent 
directors, the board with five directors needs to add one independent director (an increase from 
two to three independent directors, or 20% of the board) to comply, while the board with twenty 
directors needs to add three independent directors (an increase from eight to eleven independent 
directors, or 15% of the board) to comply. We then use fitted values from this regression as the 
predicted changes in the proportion of independent directors between 2000 and 2004 with which 
we identify the effect of changes in board structure on changes in firm transparency in the second 
stage.  
As we discuss in more detail below, we measure changes in the proportion of 
independent directors and other variables over the period 2000 and 2004, where 2004 is the first 
year that firms were required to comply with the regulations, and 2000 is the latest year in which 
the new regulations could not have been reasonably anticipated. 
 Our second-stage empirical specification is as follows: 
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Change in Information Variable2000-2004 = a0 
  +a1*Change in % Ind. Directors2000-2004(predicted)   
+ ∑a2*Change in Controls2000-2004 + ∑a3*Controls2000 
+ industry indicators + error             (4) 
 
As dependent variables, we examine three categories of variables that measure various aspects of 
firm transparency: 1) a comprehensive measure of information asymmetry between informed and 
uninformed shareholders, as measured by changes in the information asymmetry component of 
the bid-ask spread; 2) disclosure choices by management that can influence transparency, as 
measured by changes in the frequency and precision of management forecasts, and accruals 
quality; and 3) information intermediation that may have changed as a consequence of the 
change in transparency, as measured by changes in analyst following and consensus, institutional 
holdings, the number of shareholders, and audit fees. We view these latter two categories of 
dependent variables as potential mechanisms through which boards and managers can influence 
transparency. For example, the incidence and accuracy of management forecasts and earnings 
quality are considered to be discretionary information channels that managers use to influence 
corporate transparency.  We describe how we measure these information variables in more detail 
below.  
In both the first- and second-stage regressions, we control for contemporaneous changes 
in (1) the natural logarithm of total assets, (2) research and development expenditures, (3) 
leverage, (4) the natural logarithm of the number of business segments, (5) the natural logarithm 
of firm age, (6) return volatility, (7) the natural logarithm of share price, and (8) the book-to-
market ratio. For completeness, although the specification in (2) does not require them, we also 
include the initial value (i.e., as of 2000) of each control variable, and industry fixed effects to 
control for the possibility that the effect of a change in board structure on firm transparency 
- 16 - 
 
depends on their initial level of transparency and other features of their initial governance 
structure. 
  
4. Sample and Variable Measurement  
4.1. Sample 
We specify a sample period that starts just before the exchange regulations would have 
been anticipated and ends just after the first time firms were required to comply with the 
regulations. As noted above, firms that were not initially compliant with the regulations were 
required to change their boards by the earlier of (1) the firm's first annual shareholders meeting 
after January 15, 2004; or (2) October 31, 2004. For example, a December fiscal-year-end firm 
needed to comply with the regulations by its Spring 2004 annual meeting. As another example, a 
firm that typically holds its annual meeting in November would need to comply either at its 
November 2003 annual meeting or at a special meeting held before November 2004. These 
examples illustrate that most firms were required to comply by their annual meetings between 
November 1, 2003 and October 31, 2004, and we use this period as the ending point for our 
sample. Because the annual meeting generally occurs between four and six months following a 
firm’s fiscal year-end, at the ending point, the sample firms have fiscal years ending between 
May 2004 and June 2005. 
 To determine the starting point for the sample, we match the ending point sample firms to 
the same firms four years earlier. The starting point then consists of firm-years with fiscal years 
that end between May 2000 and June 2001, and with annual meetings between October, 1999 
and December, 2000.11 We note that this starting period is before the Enron collapse in 2001, 
                                                 
11 The months of the annual meetings for the starting period and ending period are not necessarily the same because 
firms do not always have their annual meetings in exactly the same month each year. 
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SOX in 2002, and the NYSE and Nasdaq regulations in 2003. For convenience, we refer to the 
starting period as the “2000 starting period” and the ending period as the “2004 ending period.” 
See Figure 1 for a summary of timing.  
To be included in our sample, we require that a firm has non-missing data on board 
independence at both the starting point and ending point of the sample period (as defined above). 
We begin with a sample of firms for which we have board independence data in 2004. Following 
Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009), we delete firms that are not members of the NYSE or 
Nasdaq. We eliminate foreign private issuers following Berger, Li, and Wong (2011). We also 
exclude “controlled companies,” which we define as those with dual class shares, or for which 
more than 50% of the company’s voting power in electing directors is held by an individual, a 
group, or another company.12 As noted above, foreign private issuers and controlled firms are 
exempt from a number of the exchanges’ governance rules, including the requirement of having 
a majority of independent directors.  
This leaves a sample of 1,846 firms with board independence data in 2004. We obtain 
board data primarily from RiskMetrics, and supplement these data with additional observations 
available from the Corporate Library and Equilar. RiskMetrics provides data on board 
independence for 1,301 of these firms in 2000; the remaining board independence data for 2000 
we collect by hand. Consistent with prior research (e.g., Linck et al., 2008; Duchin et al., 2010) 
and with NYSE/Nasdaq regulations, we define a director to be independent if he or she is an 
outsider with no material relationship with the firm. We follow Chhachharia and Grinstein’s 
(2009, p.238) procedure for identifying gray directors. We reclassify directors labeled as “gray” 
                                                 
12 We identify firms with dual class shares using the data set described in, and provided by, Gompers, Ishii, and 
Metrick (2010). 
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as independent if more than three years have passed since the director was employed by the firm 
(if applicable) and the director has only a de minimis business relationship with the firm. 
All our tests require the board data, data from Compustat and CRSP to estimate the 
controls in Eqs. (3) and (4), and data to estimate the information asymmetry component of the 
bid-asked spread (IAC_spread). Our sample size varies between 1,428 and 1,849 firm-
observations depending upon the specific test. This variation occurs because we only require data 
for the necessary variables for a firm to be included in a given test.  
4.2. Corporate transparency variables  
4.2.1. IAC_spread 
IAC_spread measures the extent to which unexpected order flow affects prices and is 
increasing in information asymmetry. This variable measures the effect of information 
asymmetry on a firm’s stock price (i.e., the price impact or adverse selection that results from 
information asymmetry between informed and uninformed shareholders). We measure 
IAC_spread following Madhavan, Richardson, and Roomans (1997), as modified by Armstrong 
et al. (2011). The procedure yields an estimated adverse selection component as a percentage of 
price, which we label IAC_spread. We measure IAC_Spread each month using all intra-day data 
for that month for each firm in the sample. We then average the monthly estimate of IAC_spread 
over the six months centered on each firm’s fiscal year end (i.e., from three months before to 
three months following) to derive the measure IAC_spread that we use in our tests.  
 One concern with IAC_spread in our research setting is that the NYSE and Nasdaq 
exchanges completed the decimalization of share prices on January 29, 2001 and April 9, 2001, 
respectively. Driven in part by this institutional change, bid-ask spreads substantially decreased 
during our sample period (see Table 1, Panel A). To ensure that our tests do not capture spurious 
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effects that are attributable to any systematic difference in the average reduction in bid-ask 
spreads between compliant and non-compliant firms, we also use the ranked value of 
IAC_Spread. In particular, we use the average of the monthly rank of the adverse selection 
component of the bid-ask spread during the six months centered on the firm’s fiscal year end. 
Changes in this ranked measure capture relative changes in IAC_spread for our sample firms. 
4.2.2. Management disclosure variables 
 We define the number of management forecasts, log(1+Management Forecasts), as the 
natural logarithm of one plus the number of annual earnings per share forecasts issued by 
management during the six months centered on the fiscal year end. We also measure the 
precision of these management forecasts, Avg. Mgt. Forecast Precision, using the five category 
approach of Rogers and Van Buskirk (2009): We assign forecast precision of 4 for point 
estimates, 3 for range estimates, 2 for open-ended estimates, 1 for qualitative estimates, and 0 for 
no forecast. Management forecast data are obtained from the First Call Company Issued 
Guidelines (CIG) database.  
 We use the accruals quality measure proposed by Dechow and Dichev (2002) and 
modified by Francis et al. (2005) as a measure of firms’ accounting quality. We estimate accruals 
quality using residuals from cross-sectional regressions of total current accruals on lagged, 
current, and one-year-ahead cash flows and the change in revenue and property, plant, and 
equipment. Thus, accruals quality is higher when accruals are more highly correlated with the 
current and adjacent years’ cash flows. Prior research (e.g., Aboody et al., 2005; Francis et al., 
2005) suggests that when the variance of the residuals from this regression is higher, earnings 
quality is lower, and information asymmetry is higher. We estimate the accruals regressions at 
the Fama-French 48 industry level, with the requirement that there are no fewer than ten 
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observations in the industry regression. Much research estimates accruals quality as the standard 
deviation of five years of residuals, but because we measure changes over a four-year period, this 
convention is not appropriate in our setting. Instead, as a proxy for changes in the standard 
deviation, we compare the absolute value of the residual in 2000 with its counterpart in 2004 
(MDD Absolute Accruals).13  
4.2.3. Information intermediary variables 
We construct four variables to proxy for changes in intermediaries that are expected to be 
related to changes in transparency. The number of analysts, log(1+Number Analysts), is the 
natural logarithm of one plus the number of analysts on IBES that issued a one-year ahead 
earnings per share forecast during the six month period centered on the fiscal year end. Prior 
research documents that analysts tend to cover more transparent firms (e.g., Bhushan, 1989; 
Lang and Lundholm, 1996; Healy, Hutton, and Palepu, 1999; Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith, 
2005). Analyst Consensus, is the natural logarithm of one plus the standard deviation of the most 
recent IBES consensus earnings per share forecast (prior to the earnings announcement date) 
scaled by total assets per share averaged over the six months centered on the fiscal year end. 
Institutional holdings, log(Inst. Holdings %), is the natural logarithm of the percentage of the 
firm’s shares held by institutional investors either on, or as of the end of the most recent quarter 
after the fiscal year end. Institutional ownership data are obtained from the Thomson-Reuters 
Institutional Holdings (13F) Database. Healy, Hutton, and Palepu (1999) and Bushee and Noe 
(2000) find higher institutional ownership at firms with greater disclosure. Finally, we measure 
                                                 
13 An alternative proxy for accruals quality is the absolute value of discretionary accruals estimated using the 
modified Jones Model. Absolute accruals from this model can be considered as a proxy for earnings management, 
which independent directors might seek to limit as argued by Chen et al. (2011). However, it is also plausible that 
these accruals proxy for managers’ conveying information (e.g., Watts and Zimmerman, 1986, and empirical papers 
by Guay, Kothari, and Watts, 1996; Tucker and Zarowin, 2006; Bowen et al., 2008), which independent directors 
might seek to enhance. Given the ambiguity about what discretionary accruals captures, we do not examine this 
proxy. 
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Log(Number Shareholders) as the natural logarithm of the number of shareholders as of the 
fiscal year end. Grullon et al. (2004) find that measures of firm size and investor recognition 
(e.g., advertising expense, market value, and firm age) are positively associated with the number 
of shareholders.   
We note that although our intermediation variables are expected to proxy for corporate 
transparency, we are agnostic as to the direction of causality. That is, it may be that independent 
directors improve transparency, and this attracts more analysts, institutions, and shareholders, or 
instead that more of these intermediaries improve transparency. For example, independent 
directors may encourage greater analyst following or more institutional investors, which could, 
in turn, improve transparency. Consistent with this simultaneity, Brennan and Subrahmanyam 
(1995) show that a reduction in information asymmetry increases the number of analysts, but that 
that causality also runs in the opposite direction in that an increase in the number of analysts 
reduces information asymmetry. Likewise, Grullon et al. (2004) and Armstrong et al. (2011) 
suggest that one consequence of more shareholders is improved transparency. 
4.2.4. Auditor fees 
Prior research argues that a more thorough audit increases transparency (e.g., Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1986). We collect data on total fees charged by the auditor (audit fees and non-
audit such as audit-related compliance and due diligence fees), and examine whether non-
compliant firms spend more on auditor services when they increase director independence.14 In 
contrast to our construction of the other dependent variables, for total auditor fees we examine 
only the amount paid for fiscal year 2004, rather than the change from 2000 to 2004. SOX 
                                                 
14 In the auditor fee regressions, we include two additional controls. First, we include an indicator that takes a value 
of one if the firm is audited by a big four auditor, and zero otherwise. Second, we include an indicator that takes a 
value of one if the auditor is in its first year with the firm, and zero otherwise. 
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limited the type of non-audit (consulting) services that can be provided by auditors. 
Consequently, auditor fees in 2004 are unlikely to be comparable to those in 2000.  
 
5. Results 
5.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 1, Panel A provides descriptive statistics for our sample firms partitioned into 
“compliant” and “non-compliant” groups based on whether the firm complied with the new 
exchange board structure requirement at the start of our sample period. Our sample contains 
1,396 compliant firms and 543 non-compliant firms as of 2000. By construction, the compliant 
firms have a substantially greater fraction of independent directors than the non-compliant firms 
in 2000 (mean of 72% versus 40%).  
Most important for our analysis, however, is the substantial increase in the proportion of 
independent directors for the non-compliant firms during the sample period from 2000 to 2004 to 
comply with the listing regulations. For the non-compliant firms, the fraction of independent 
directors increases significantly from 40% to 58% in 2004, which represents roughly a 45% 
increase. The proportion of independent directors at the compliant firms, in contrast, remains 
relatively constant, with a mean of 72% in 2000 and 74% in 2004. This suggests that these firms 
had a relatively stable board structure during the sample period and represent an appropriate 
benchmark against which to compare the effects of an increase in independent directors at the 
non-compliant firms. Thus, the regulations appear to be a powerful instrument for required board 
structure changes that are sufficiently large to produce detectable changes in firms’ transparency.  
Panel A of Table 1 also reports other descriptive statistics for the compliant and non-
compliant samples as of the year 2000, and changes in these variables from 2000 to 2004. 
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Consistent with our predictions, non-compliant firms experience a significantly larger decrease 
in the information asymmetry component of the spread (IAC_Spread), and a significantly larger 
increase in the number of management forecasts, analyst following, and institutional holdings, as 
compared to compliant firms. We note, however, that the descriptive statistics also indicate that 
the compliant and non-compliant firms differ along several dimensions. For example, compliant 
firms are, on average, somewhat larger and older, have more leverage and less volatile stock 
returns, and have larger boards (with about one more director, on average). Therefore, these 
univariate findings should be interpreted with caution. 
We also provide descriptive statistics on how firms alter their initial board structure to 
comply with the exchange listing requirements. Because compliance is based on the ratio of 
independent directors to board size, a non-compliant firm can comply by decreasing board size 
(and removing inside or gray directors) or increasing board size. Table 1, Panel B, shows that 
145 non-compliant firms reduced the size of their board. These firms went from an average of 
9.89 directors to 7.88 directors—an average decrease of 2.01 directors. This average overall 
reduction in board size was the result of adding 0.98 independent directors, but removing 1.63 
inside directors and 1.36 gray directors. The second set of columns shows that 308 non-
compliant firms increased the size of their board from 7.14 to 8.35 directors, on average. This 
average increase in board size was the result of adding 2.01 independent directors, and removing 
0.28 inside and 0.52 gray directors. Overall, there is substantial cross-sectional variation in how 
firms adjust the size and composition of their boards to comply with the regulations.        
5.2. First-stage model of Change in % Independent Directors 
Table 2 presents the results from the first-stage model (Eq. 3 above) predicting the 
change in proportion of independent directors from 2000 to 2004 as a function of the minimum 
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required change in the proportion of independent directors. As expected, the minimum required 
change is a strong positive predictor of the change in independent directors, which is consistent 
with non-compliant firms being required to increase their proportion of independent directors to 
avoid being in violation of the new regulations and possibly delisted. The R-squared of the 
regression is 27.7%, suggesting a reasonably good fit. The partial R-squared of the instrument is 
22.0%, and is highly significant. 
5.3. The effect of changes in independent directors on corporate transparency 
Table 3 presents our second-stage results from estimating Eq. (4). In Panel A, we 
examine changes in information asymmetry, IAC_Spread, as a function of the predicted change 
in the proportion of independent directors from the first-stage model plus controls. Bid-ask 
spreads incorporate information from a wide range of sources, and as such, we view IAC_Spread 
as our most comprehensive measure of corporate transparency. In Panel B, we examine changes 
in the other information variables: number and precision of management forecasts, accruals 
quality, number and consensus of analysts, institutional holdings, number of shareholders, and 
total fees paid to the firm’s auditor.     
In Panel A of Table 3, we find strong evidence that increases in the proportion of 
independent directors leads to reductions in the information asymmetry component of the bid-ask 
spread, which is consistent with our conjecture that an increase in the proportion of independent 
directors requires improved transparency. Given the 18 percentage point average increase in the 
proportion of independent directors by non-compliant firms during the sample period (from 40% 
to 58% at the mean), the -0.361 coefficient on the predicted change in the proportion of 
independent directors in column (1) translates to roughly a 6.3% decrease in information 
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asymmetry.15 Column (2) shows that this result is robust to using the ranked value of 
IAC_spread, which should be less affected by absolute changes from the decimalization of share 
prices on the NYSE and Nasdaq exchanges that occurred during our sample period. 
Panel B explores this relation further by testing for changes in more specific determinants 
of corporate transparency. We find that an increase in the proportion of independent directors 
leads to significant increases in both the frequency and precision of management forecasts, as 
well as the number of analysts following the firm. We also find marginally significant increases 
in analyst forecast consensus. We find no significant relation between the change in the 
proportion of independent directors and accruals quality, institutional holdings, the number of 
shareholders, and auditor fees. Overall, these results provide some support for the hypothesis that 
firms can and do alter their transparency to accommodate an increased proportion of independent 
directors. 
We note that these results are robust to controlling for levels and changes in many firm 
characteristics, as well as industry controls, as shown in Table 3. We also give consideration to 
Duchin et al.’s (2010) finding that changes in the proportion of independent directors leads to 
increases in performance, as measured by Tobin’s Q and stock returns. A potential concern with 
our results could be that increases in corporate transparency are a manifestation of improved 
performance (since poorly performing firms have been shown to have greater information 
asymmetry). Because our controls include the change in book-to-market and the change in 
log(price), however, we effectively control for the increases in Tobin’s Q (the inverse of book-
to-market) and stock returns (approximately the change in log(price)) documented by Duchin et 
al. (2010). 
                                                 
15 The coefficient of -0.361 applies to a change in the natural logarithm of information asymmetry, so an 18% 
increase in the proportion of independent directors results in a decrease of 6.3% = exp(-0.361*18%) -1.  
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5.4. Caveats 
We note the following caveats about our use of NYSE and Nasdaq regulations as an 
instrument for changes in board composition. First, there was a trend in regulations aimed at 
increasing board independence during this period. Other changes by the exchanges and the 
Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act required that the audit, compensation, and nominating committees 
consist entirely of independent directors. Our research design implicitly assumes that changes in 
board independence have more of an effect on firms’ transparency than changes in the 
independence of any of its separate committees. This assumption is consistent with results in 
Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009, p. 244), who find that “the requirement for a majority of 
independent directors, rather than that of compensation committee independence or nominating 
committee independence, is important to compensation decisions.” We examine this assumption 
below in the context of the audit committee. 
Second, in addition to the independence rules, the NYSE and Nasdaq and SOX added 
other corporate governance requirements. Our research design does not explicitly control for 
these changes, which may lower our power in the event the changes are not correlated with 
changes to board structure. Although these governance changes may have also affected firm 
transparency, these changes should not bias our inferences unless they also happen to be 
correlated with our instrument. Our tests below for differential effects of changes in the 
proportion of independent directors across groups of firms (e.g., low vs. high information costs) 
helps to address this issue.  
Finally, many of these regulatory changes were in response to frauds and other 
accounting irregularities that were thought to have occurred, in part, because of deficient board 
structures and lax oversight. Although these governance changes may be considered endogenous 
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for certain firms such as Enron, whose fraud may have prompted certain regulations, we follow 
prior literature and consider the regulatory changes to be largely exogenous from the perspective 
of most firms.16 
5.5. Placebo test using firms that were exempt from exchange regulations  
To mitigate the concern that firms with a low proportion of independent directors may 
have been forced to increase their transparency for reasons other than the exchanges’ board 
compliance requirements, we now conduct a “placebo” test. Our test relies on the fact that 
controlled firms (firms with a 50% or more owner) were exempt from the exchanges’ board 
independence regulations, which means that they were not required by the exchanges to increase 
board independence.17 By contrast, these controlled firms were required to comply with other 
governance requirements including SOX (Schaumann, 2004, p. 1317).18  
We match controlled firms to firms that were otherwise similar. With this matching, we 
hope to isolate the effect of changes required by the exchange rules. We create two groups of 
firms: one group that is exempt from the exchanges’ requirement to increase independence, and 
another group that is not exempt. We begin with a sample of 363 firms that were exempt from 
the regulations because they were controlled. We match each of these firms with a firm that is 
not exempt from the regulations (these are firms that are in our main sample shown in Table 1). 
We form the matched pairs using propensity scores obtained from a logit model for whether the 
firm is exempt. We include as explanatory variables all of the variables in Eq. (1) above, one-
                                                 
16 Larcker et al. (2011, p. 4) argue that “so long as the regulatory shift is not the result of actions on the part of every 
individual firm, the regulatory shift can be treated as largely exogenous. For example, many argue that the Enron 
scandal was the impetus for new regulation. While the resulting regulation might be considered endogenous to 
Enron, the Enron scandal and ensuing regulations were beyond the control of most firms. Thus, the resulting 
regulation is largely exogenous.” Similarly, although the exchange regulations for board independence represented 
an endogenous response to perceived governance deficiencies, they were largely exogenous from the perspective of 
any particular firm.  
17 Source: NYSE Corporate Governance Rules and NASDAQ Corporate Governance Rules.   
18 Foreign firms were also exempt from the independence rules, but we exclude them because they are also exempt 
from several other transparency requirements of SOX (Iliev, 2010). 
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digit SIC indicators, and the beginning (fiscal year 2000) values of the transparency variables. 
Because we form matched pairs without replacement and use a caliper of 0.01, we are unable to 
match 35 firms. Our final sample therefore consists of 328 matched pairs and a total sample of 
656 observations. In untabulated tests, we confirm that the exempt and non-exempt samples are 
otherwise similar except that the exempt firms are not required to change their boards.  
To compare changes in board structure and transparency between the exempt and non-
exempt firms, we estimate the following regression, in which the variable of interest is the 
indicator variable Non-Exempt:  
Change in Variable2000-2004 = a0 +b1*Non-Exempt+ b2*Controls +industry indicators +error  (5) 
We include as control variables all of the variables in Eq. (1) above, the beginning (i.e., fiscal 
year 2000) values of the transparency variables, and two-digit SIC indicators. If transparency 
changes for reasons other than the exchange requirements, we expect the two groups of firms to 
show similar increases in transparency, and the coefficient on Non-Exempt will not be different 
from zero. On the other hand, if it is the required change in board structure that causes the 
change in transparency, then non-exempt firms should have larger increases in transparency than 
their non-exempt counterparts.  
The results of the placebo test are presented in Table 4. In the first row, we find that non-
exempt firms increased their proportion of independent directors significantly more than their 
exempt counterparts. This finding corroborates the power of our instrument for inducing non-
exempt firms to alter their board structure. Relative to their exempt counterparts, non-exempt 
firms experienced a significantly greater decrease in Log(IAC_Spread), and a significantly 
greater increase in the number of analysts and analyst forecast consensus. We also find 
consistently greater increases in transparency across the other proxies, although none of the other 
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differences is individually significant at conventional levels. Overall, our results from this 
analysis are consistent with the exchanges’ board independence requirements rather than some 
other contemporaneous event inducing the changes in firm transparency documented in Table 3.  
5.6. Cross-sectional effects  
The above research design estimates the unconditional effect of changes in board 
structure on changes in transparency. However, the relation between required changes in board 
independence and transparency is not expected to be the same across all firms.  
To test for cross-sectional effects, we identify proxies for the predicted cross-sectional 
relations and construct indicator variables (Indicator) that measure whether each variable is high 
or low. We then interact the indicators with Min. % Change ID and estimate the following 
modified version of Eq. (4): 
Change in Information Variable2000-2004 = a0 + a1*Min. % Change ID*Indicator + 
  +a2*Min. % Change ID*(1-Indicator) + a3*Indicator+    
+ ∑a4*Change in Controls2000-2004 + ∑a5*Controls2000 
+ industry indicators + error             (6) 
 
Note that we use Min. % Change ID rather than the predicted change in independence. For 
comparison purposes, Panel A of Table 5 shows that inferences from using the instrument rather 
than the predicted value are identical to those in Table 3. We use the instrument because our 
interest is in the interaction, and to highlight that these regressions are not 2SLS.19 Our main 
interest is in comparing the coefficient a1, which captures the effect of required changes in the 
proportion of independent directors for high values of the indicator, with a2, which captures the 
effect of required changes in the proportion of directors for low values of the indicator.    
                                                 
19 We obtain similar results when we use the predicted change (untabulated), which is not surprising given the 
relatively high partial R-squared of Min. % Change ID compared to the total variation explained when estimating 
Eq. (3) (22.0% compared to 27.7%).  
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For our first predicted cross-sectional relation, we examine whether firms with non-
independent audit committees had greater improvements in transparency to accommodate the 
arguably greater information demands of new independent directors who would serve on that 
committee. During our sample period, regulations were passed that required firms to not only 
have a board with a majority of independent directors, but also to have an audit committee with 
100% independent directors (Duchin et al., 2010). We conjecture that firms requiring 
adjustments to both their full board and to their audit committee will require larger 
improvements in transparency.  
We collect data on audit committee independence and construct an indicator that takes a 
value of one if the firm’s audit committee consisted entirely of independent directors at the 
beginning of the sample period, and zero otherwise. The results in Panel B of Table 5 indicate 
that information asymmetry decreases more for firms that were required to make larger changes 
in board independence and were also required to increase their audit committee independence. 
The results also indicate that these firms increased total auditor fees by more than firms with 
fully independent audit committees. These results suggest that improvements in transparency are 
even more important for firms that must increase both full board independence as well as audit 
committee independence, and also that independent directors may view increased audit fees as a 
mechanism that commits managers to greater internal control and compliance with respect to 
financial reporting.                        
In Panel C, similar to Duchin et al. (2010), we examine whether the initial level of 
information asymmetry affects the efficacy of independent directors. We construct a measure of 
inherent information processing costs, which we expect to constrain the ability of independent 
directors to induce changes in their firm’s transparency (or constrain managers’ ability to 
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improve transparency prior to the change in board structure). Because prior studies have used a 
number of proxies to capture this construct, we use Principal Components Analysis (PCA) to 
reduce the dimensionality and produce a scalar measure that is more amenable to our research 
design.20 We use the first principal component as our measure of firms’ inherent information 
processing costs, which we label IA_factor. 
We find that only the relation between the change in the proportion of independent 
directors and the number of shareholders in Column 8 is significantly stronger for firms with low 
information processing costs (the coefficients for analyst following and analyst forecast 
consensus are considerably larger for low information processing firms, but the differences are 
only marginally significant). The other columns, however, show no significant differences, and 
overall the results provide only modest evidence that high information processing costs attenuate 
the effects in Table 3. 
There could be variation in the extent to which firms’ directors who, although technically 
independent, are actually independent of the CEO. We follow prior literature (e.g., Core, 
Holthausen, and Larcker, 1999) and measure the proportion of firms’ independent directors who 
were appointed during the CEO’s tenure to isolate directors that were likely selected by the 
CEO.21 In Panel D, we find that the relation between the change in the proportion of independent 
                                                 
20 Specifically, we use the following variables (Compustat data labels in parentheses) measured at the beginning of 
our sample period (i.e., 2000) in our PCA: (1) the natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets, (2) annual research and 
development expenditures scaled by total annual sales  and set to zero if annual research and development 
expenditures are missing, (3) leverage, (4) the natural logarithm of the total number of business segments, (5) the 
natural logarithm of the firm’s age (measured using the first year during which appears in the CRSP database), (6) 
the standard deviation of monthly stock returns during the previous 24 months, and (7) the book-to-market equity 
ratio. 
21 We calculate the proportion of the firm’s independent directors who were appointed after the CEO assumed 
office. Prior studies (e.g., Core, Holthausen, and Larcker, 1999) suggest that independent directors who are 
appointed under the CEO’s leadership may be beholden to the CEO, and are therefore less independent. We have 
machine readable data on the date directors joined the board for about 55% of our sample companies; for the 
remainder we impute the fraction appointed under the CEO. To do this, we estimate a regression of the fraction of 
directors appointed under the CEO on CEO tenure, and use these estimates and CEO tenure to predict the missing 
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directors and management forecast frequency and precision are stronger for firms where fewer 
independent directors have been appointed during the current CEO’s tenure (the former being 
marginally significant and latter being significant at conventional levels).  
In Panel E, we predict that there will be variation according to the fraction of shares 
owned by insiders (i.e., officers and directors). When insiders have greater voting control, they 
may be reluctant to increase transparency for the benefit of independent directors, and/or 
independent directors may be less effective in changing corporate transparency. We use inside 
ownership data gathered by Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011), which is measured about one month 
before the proxy date, and is scaled by the total number of shares outstanding at that time. We 
find that the effect of a change in independent directors on management forecast precision is 
significantly larger for firms with less than 20% inside ownership (the relation with management 
forecast frequency is again marginally significant). The other columns show no significant 
differences.  
The fact that the results show relations between entrenchment and management forecasts, 
but not the other transparency proxies, may reflect the relative ease with which management can 
alter the properties of their forecasts vis-à-vis the other transparency measures. Overall, we 
interpret the evidence as providing modest support for the information processing costs and 
managerial entrenchment hypotheses.  
Finally, we examine whether non-compliant firms that decrease board size have 
differential changes in corporate transparency. As noted above, non-compliant firms that 
decrease their board size (by removing inside and gray directors) retain mainly the same set of 
independent directors. These remaining independent directors may now have a greater ability to 
                                                                                                                                                             
values. Because the dependent variable is a fraction ranging from zero to one, we estimate a fractional logit model 
following Papke and Wooldridge (1996). 
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address any transparency problems because inside control of the board has diminished. On the 
other hand, non-compliant firms that choose to add independent directors (and therefore increase 
the size of the board) may need to commit to a level of transparency necessary to satisfy the 
demands of the new independent directors.     
We create an indicator for firms that decreased the size of their board, and present results 
in Panel F. The results are somewhat consistent with a greater change in transparency for firms 
that increase their board size. Firms that became compliant by increasing the number of directors 
(Min % Change ID2000*Board Size Up) experienced a significant decrease in the information 
asymmetry component of their bid-ask spread (IAC_Spread). Further, this decrease is 
significantly greater than the coefficient on IAC_Spread for firms that decreased their board size. 
For the other transparency variables, the coefficients are not significantly different between firms 
that increased and decreased their board size. An important caveat to these results is that the 
choice to decrease board size is not exogenous in that firms are expected to consider the various 
costs and benefits when deciding how to comply with the board independence regulations.  
5.7. Timing and method of compliance 
In this section, we explore whether changes in transparency are made in anticipation of 
increasing board independence, or whether the changes occur only after board independence 
increases. As noted above, existing directors and managers may improve the information 
environment in order to attract new, relatively uninformed, independent directors. Alternatively, 
if management is unwilling or unable to improve the information environment, improvements in 
transparency may not occur until after new independent directors join the board, or after some of 
the inside directors are removed from the board.  
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As an initial step, we examine the timing of changes in transparency over our four-year 
sample period. To do this, we estimate the following modified version of Eq. (4), in which we 
compute changes in both the information environment and controls over the first half of the 
sample period (2000 to 2002): 
Change in Information Variable2000-2002 = a0 
  +a1* Min % Change ID2000   
+ ∑a2*Change in Controls2000-2002 + ∑a3*Controls2000 
+ industry indicators + error             (7) 
If changes in transparency occur uniformly throughout the full sample period, the coefficient on 
Min % Change ID2000 in the first half of the sample period should be about 50% of the full-
sample period coefficient. Alternatively, if the changes in transparency occur mainly in the first 
(second) half of the sample period, then coefficient on Min % Change ID2000 in the first half of 
the sample period should be significantly more (less) than 50% of the full sample period 
coefficient.  
 Panel A of Table 6 presents the results of this test. (Because we use a single cross-section 
in 2004 for auditor fees, we exclude auditor fees from Table 6). For parsimony, we report only 
coefficient estimates on Min % Change ID2000, and asterisks indicating the level of statistical 
significance. The first row repeats the full sample estimates of the coefficient on Min % Change 
ID2000 from Table 5. The second row shows the estimated coefficient on Min % Change ID2000 
during the 2000 to 2002 period. The third row shows the ratio of the coefficients from the first 
half and the full period. For seven of eight variables, the ratio is greater than 50%, and the ratios 
for management forecast precision and analyst following are significantly greater than 50%. 
Collectively, these results in Panel A suggest that more of the increase in transparency occurs 
during the first half of the 2000 to 2004 period. 
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In Panel B, we examine how changes in transparency relate to the timing of compliance 
by the noncompliant firms. Recall that Table 1 shows that 40% of the noncompliant firms 
become compliant by 2002, which suggests that the increase in the proportion of independent 
directors for the non-compliant firms occurs gradually during the sample period. If 
improvements in corporate transparency occur after (before) the increase in board independence, 
then we expect the coefficients on Min % Change ID2000 will be greater in the latter (earlier) half 
of the sample period for those firms that became compliant earlier (later) in the sample period.  
To examine this prediction, we create indicators that partition the non-compliant firms 
into those that became compliant in the first half of the sample period (Compliant Early) and 
those that became compliant in the second half of the sample period (Compliant Late). We then 
estimate a modified version of Eq. (6) that interacts these indicators with the minimum required 
change in board independence. The results in the first set of rows in Panel B are somewhat 
consistent with greater changes in transparency for firms that became compliant earlier in the 
sample period. The coefficients on Min % Change ID2000*Compliant Early are generally larger 
than the coefficients on Min % Change ID2000*Compliant Late, although the difference is only 
significant at the five percent level for the number of shareholders (untabulated).  
The results in the remaining rows of Panel B suggest that changes in transparency 
experienced by early compliers, however, are not concentrated in the first half of the sample 
period. In particular, the first-half to full-period ratio of the coefficients on Min % Change ID2000 
for the early compliers is greater than 50% for only four of the eight variables, and none of the 
ratios is significantly greater than 50%. On the other hand, the first-half to full-period ratios for 
the late compliers suggest that changes in transparency precede changes in board independence 
at these firms. In particular, the ratio is greater than 50% for five of the eight variables, and the 
- 36 - 
 
ratios for accruals quality and analyst following are significantly greater than 50%. These results 
suggest that firms that comply late may find it difficult to attract directors without first increasing 
transparency. An important caveat to the analysis in Table 6 is that the timing of compliance is 
likely to be an endogenous choice and the early compliers may be those that expected to derive 
the greatest net benefit from complying with the exchange requirements. Accordingly, the results 
presented in Table 6 do not have the same causal interpretation as those in our earlier analyses. 
Nevertheless, we believe that the results from this analysis are suggestive and provide some 
insight into the nuances of how non-compliant firms ultimately became compliant with the board 
independence requirements.  
 
6. Conclusion 
We present results that are generally consistent with the interpretation that an exogenous 
(required) increase in the proportion of independent directors results in increased corporate 
transparency. This relation is consistent with our hypothesis that independent directors require 
transparency to perform their monitoring and advising roles, and that both management and 
independent directors are expected to take actions necessary to ensure that these directors have 
the information necessary to carry out their charge. Our results are also nuanced by our findings 
with regard to how the relation is influenced by whether the firm: (i) has a less than fully-
independent audit committee, (ii) has high information processing costs, (iii) has symptoms of 
managerial entrenchment, and (iv) becomes compliant by adding board members and 
independent directors (as opposed to removing board members and non-independent directors). 
Specifically, our results provide some evidence (albeit modest) that an exogenous increase in the 
proportion of independent directors produces improvements in transparency for firms with fully-
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independent audit committees, high information processing costs, entrenched management, and 
when board independence is increased adding board members and independent directors (as 
opposed to removing board members and non-independent directors).  
Overall, our analysis emphasizes the joint causality in the relation between board 
structure and corporate transparency, and suggests that it is important to consider the economic 
and econometric implications of an endogenous information environment in studies of corporate 
governance. Our study also supports the presumed, but generally untested assumption that is 
common in the financial reporting and disclosure literature that independent directors can and do 
influence corporate transparency. Finally, we provide some insight into the specific channels 
through which managers and independent directors can effect changes in transparency.       
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Table 1 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
 Compliant  Non-Compliant  Test of Differences 
 Mean Median  Mean Median  t-stat z-stat 
Board Characteristics         
   Number of Directors 9.15 9.00  8.03 8.00  7.32 7.60 
   % Independent Directors 72% 71%  40% 43%  60.37 34.00 
   Min. % Change ID 0% 0%  22% 18%  -70.53 -36.85 
   Change in % Independent Directors  2% 2%  18% 17%  -23.25 -19.83 
Control Variables         
   ∆Log(Total Assets) 27% 27%  27% 28%  -0.25 -0.37 
   ∆R&D -0.01 0.00  -0.01 0.00  0.12 -1.99 
   ∆Leverage -0.02 -0.02  -0.01 0.00  -0.91 -1.71 
   ∆Log(Num. Bus. Seg.) 4% 0%  5% 0%  -0.60 -0.28 
   ∆Log(Firm Age) 32% 24%  41% 37%  -6.37 -7.52 
   ∆Return Volatility -0.20 -0.17  -0.24 -0.21  3.69 3.45 
   ∆Log(Share Price) 23% 31%  30% 33%  -1.49 -1.14 
   ∆Book-to-market -0.04 -0.02  -0.08 -0.06  3.17 2.27 
   Log(Total Assets) 7.01 6.91  6.36 6.23  6.97 7.00 
   R&D 0.06 0.00  0.05 0.00  0.15 1.87 
   Leverage 0.36 0.37  0.31 0.26  4.18 4.50 
   Log(Num. Bus. Seg.) 0.40 0.00  0.31 0.00  3.03 2.65 
   Log(Firm Age) 2.65 2.71  2.29 2.20  7.81 7.60 
   Return Volatility 0.56 0.47  0.64 0.57  -5.71 -6.43 
   Log(Share Price) 2.79 2.86  2.55 2.61  4.98 4.82 
   Book-to-market 0.70 0.74  0.70 0.68  -0.19 0.24 
   Big 4 Auditor 0.92 1.00  0.89 1.00  1.70 1.70 
   New Auditor 0.05 0.00  0.06 0.00  -0.73 -0.73 
Moderating Factors         
   Audit Committee Independence 79% 100%  38% 0%  17.55 16.26 
   IA_Factor -0.53 -0.56  -0.42 -0.39  -7.88 -7.76 
   % CEO App. ID 68% 72%  71% 76%  -2.07 -2.36 
   % Inside Ownership 10.50 6.55  20.30 17.49  -16.06 -14.66 
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Table 1 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics (cont’d) 
 
Corporate Transparency Measures         
   Change in Log(IAC_Spread) -1.10 -1.06  -1.23 -1.20  4.20 3.71 
   Change in Log(1+ Management Forecasts) 0.06 0.00  0.13 0.00  -1.91 -1.43 
   Change in Management Forecast Precision 0.06 0.00  0.10 0.00  -0.38 0.15 
   Change in MDD Absolute Accruals -0.01 0.00  -0.01 0.00  1.58 1.23 
   Change in Log(1+Number Analysts) 0.04 0.00  0.11 0.06  -2.27 -2.51 
   Change in Analyst Consensus 0.17 0.01  0.31 0.00  -1.07 -0.11 
   Change in Log(Inst. Holdings %) 0.09 0.08  0.11 0.09  -3.02 -2.26 
   Change in Log(Number Shareholders) -0.02 -0.12  0.01 -0.05  -0.72 -2.80 
   Ending Total Fees 14.36 14.27  14.10 13.99  4.02 3.82 
   Number of Observations 1,396  453    
This table presents descriptive statistics (mean and median) for our sample of firms. Compliant is the subsample of 
1,396 firms for which the proportion of independent directors more than 50% in 2000 and Non-Compliant is the 
subsample of 453 firms for which the proportion of independent directors was more than 50% in 2000. t-stat is the t-
statistic from a non-paired test of means assuming unequal variances. z-stat is the z-statistic from a Wilcoxon rank-
sum test of equality of medians. Variables measured as Change in Log() are converted into percentage changes with 
the transformation exp() -1. 
Board Characteristics are defined as follows. Number of Directors is the number of directors on the board in 2000. 
%Independent Directors is the number of independent directors scaled by the total number of directors in 2000. Min. 
% Change ID equals zero if %Independent Directors is greater than 50% in 2000, and equals the minimum number 
of independent directors required to achieve a majority of independent directors divided by Number of Directors if 
%Independent Directors is less than or equal to 50% in 2000. Change in % Independent Directors is the change in 
%Independent Directors between 2000 and 2004. 
Control Variables include both changes, measured over the period 2000 to 2004, and levels, measured during 2000, 
and are defined as follows. Log(Total Assets) is the natural logarithm of total book value of assets (AT). R&D is 
annual research and development expenditures (set to zero if missing) scaled by total annual sales (XRD / SALE). 
Leverage is the sum of book value of long-term debt and current liabilities scaled by the sum of long-term debt, 
current liabilities, common equity, and preferred equity ((DLTT + DLC) / (DLTT + DLC + CEQ + PSTK)). 
Log(Num. Bus. Seg.) is the natural logarithm of the number of business segments recorded in the Compustat 
Segment file. Log(Firm Age) is the natural logarithm firm age measured as the earliest date on which it appears in 
the CRSP database. Return Volatility is the monthly standard deviation of the previous 24 months’ stock returns. 
Share price is closing market price per share. Book-to-market is the book-to-market asset ratio (AT / (LT + 
(CSHO*PRCC_F))). Big 4 Auditor is an indicator that equals one if the firm is audited by a big four auditor, and 
zero otherwise. New Auditor is an indicator that equals one if the auditor is in its first year with the firm, and zero 
otherwise.   
Moderating Factors are measured during 2000 and are defined as follows. Audit Committee Independence is the 
proportion of independent directors on the audit committee in 2000. IA_Factor is the first principal component from 
principal components analysis of the following variables measured during 2000: (1) Log(Total Assets), (2) R&D, (3) 
Leverage, (4) Log(Num. Bus. Seg.), (5) Log(Firm Age), (6) Return Volatility, and (7) Book-to-market. % CEO App. 
ID is the proportion of independent directors who were appointed after the CEO took office if available, and 
imputed as described in the text if missing. Inside Ownership is obtained from Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2008), and is 
defined as the number of shares owned by insiders as disclosed in the annual report divided by the number of shares 
outstanding for the month prior to the proxy date.  
Corporate Transparency Measures are changes measured over the period 2000 to 2004, and are defined as follows. 
Change in log(IAC_spread) is the change in the natural logarithm of average monthly adverse selection component 
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of the bid-ask spread during the six months centered on the firm’s fiscal year end. Change in Log(1+Management 
Forecasts) is the change in the natural logarithm of one plus the number of earnings per share forecasts issued by 
management during the six months centered on the firm’s fiscal year end. Change in Avg. Mgt. Forecast Precision is 
the change in the average precision of management forecasts issued during the six months centered on the firm’s 
fiscal year end calculated following Rogers and Van Buskirk (2009): 4 for point estimates, 3 for range estimates, 2 
for open-ended estimates,1 for qualitative estimates, 0 for no forecast. Change in MDD Absolute Accruals is the 
change in absolute accruals from the modified Dechow-Dichev model. Change in Log(1+Number Analysts) is the 
change in the natural logarithm of one plus the number of analysts that issued a one-year ahead earnings per share 
forecast during the six months centered on the firm’s fiscal year end. Change in Analyst Consensus is the change in 
the natural logarithm of one plus the standard deviation of the IBES consensus earnings per share forecast (prior to 
the earnings announcement date) scaled by total assets per share during the six months centered on the firm’s fiscal 
year end. Change in Log(Inst. Holdings %) is in the natural logarithm of the percentage of the firm’s shares held by 
institutional investors either on, or as of the end of the most recent fiscal quarter after the fiscal year end. Change in 
Log(Number Shareholders) is the change in the natural logarithm of the number of shareholders as of the fiscal year 
end. Log(Total Auditor Fees) is the natural logarithm of total audit and non-audit fees for fiscal year 2004. 
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Table 1 (cont’d) 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics for Non-compliant Firms by Change in Board Size 
 
 
Non-compliant firms that 
Decreased Board Size  
Non-compliant firms that Did 
Not Decrease Board Size 
Variable  Mean Median  Mean Median 
Number of Directors  9.89 9.00  7.14 7.00 
Change in Number of Directors -2.01 -2.00  1.21 1.00 
Change in Number of Independent Directors 0.98 1.00  2.01 2.00 
Change in Number of Inside Directors -1.63 -1.00  -0.28 0.00 
Change in Number of Gray Directors -1.36 -1.00  -0.52 0.00 
Noncompliant in 2002 0.62 1.00  0.59 1.00 
Audit Committee Independence 0.63 1.00  0.62 1.00 
Number of Observations 145  308 
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Table 2 
First-stage Determinants of Change in the Proportion of Independent Directors 
This table presents the results from an OLS regression in which the dependent variable is the change in the 
percentage of independent directors from the 2000 starting period through the 2004 ending period. Min. % Change 
ID equals the minimum percent change in the proportion of independent directors that is required for noncompliant 
firms to achieve a majority of independent directors, and zero for compliant firms. ∆ denotes the change in the 
respective variable measured over the sample period and the remaining variables are measured at the start of the 
sample period (the exact timing is described in Section 3). Industry fixed-effects for the 48 Fama and French (1997) 
industries are included but not reported. t-statistics calculated based on robust standard errors clustered at the Fama 
and French (1997) industry level are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. Statistical significance 
(two-sided) at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
Change in % 
Independent  
Directors 
Change in% 
Independent  
Directors 
Min. % Change ID  0.647*** 
  (19.61) 
∆Log(Total Assets) 0.002 -0.001 
 (0.13) (-0.06) 
∆R&D 0.015 0.108 
 (0.18) (1.31) 
∆Leverage -0.009 -0.010 
 (-0.39) (-0.50) 
∆Log(Num. Bus. Seg.) 0.010 0.007 
 (1.02) (0.77) 
∆Log(Firm Age) -0.020 0.008 
 (-0.47) (0.18) 
∆Return Volatility 0.005 0.021 
 (0.20) (0.98) 
∆Log(Share Price) -0.007 0.003 
 (-0.82) (0.40) 
∆Book-to-market -0.052* -0.004 
 (-1.84) (-0.18) 
Log(Total Assets) 0.010*** 0.014*** 
 (3.56) (6.10) 
R&D -0.148*** -0.004 
 (-3.59) (-0.08) 
Leverage -0.033 -0.034* 
 (-1.49) (-1.72) 
Log(Num. Bus. Seg.) 0.010 0.009 
 (1.11) (1.00) 
Log(Firm Age) -0.018 -0.000 
 (-1.45) (-0.00) 
Return Volatility 0.044 0.033* 
 (1.61) (1.81) 
Log(Share Price) -0.004 -0.001 
 (-0.59) (-0.25) 
Book-to-market -0.038** -0.014 
 (-2.28) (-1.07) 
Observations 1,846 1,846 
R-squared 0.057 0.277 
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Table 3  
Second-stage regressions: Information Variables on Predicted Change in Ind. Directors  
This table presents estimates of the second-stage regressions from Equation (4). The dependent variable in column 
(1) is Change in Log(IAC_spread). The dependent variable in column (2) is Change in Rank(IAC_Spread), which is 
the change in the of average monthly rank of the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread during the six 
months centered on the firm’s fiscal year end. The remaining variables are defined in the notes of Table 1. Industry 
fixed-effects for the 48 Fama and French (1997) industries are included but not reported. t-statistics calculated based 
on robust standard errors clustered at the Fama and French (1997) industry level are reported in parentheses below 
the coefficient estimates. Statistical significance (two-sided) at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are denoted by ***, **, 
and *, respectively. 
Panel A: Change in Information Asymmetry 
 Change in Log (IAC_Spread) 
Change in Rank 
(IAC_Spread) 
 (1) (2) 
∆% Indep. Directors (predicted) -0.361** -0.086** 
 (-2.64) (-2.55) 
∆Log(Total Assets) -0.286*** -0.086*** 
 (-11.64) (-11.36) 
∆R&D 0.363* 0.125* 
 (1.90) (1.87) 
∆Leverage 0.025 0.009 
 (0.43) (0.50) 
∆Log(Num. Bus. Seg.) -0.038* -0.011* 
 (-1.87) (-1.89) 
∆Log(Firm Age) -0.199 -0.056 
 (-1.17) (-1.34) 
∆Return Volatility -0.130 -0.017 
 (-1.51) (-0.87) 
∆Log(Share Price) -0.395*** -0.103*** 
 (-12.19) (-11.75) 
∆Book-to-market 0.161 0.065** 
 (1.51) (2.27) 
Log(Total Assets) 0.066*** -0.006** 
 (5.75) (-2.03) 
R&D -0.313 -0.042 
 (-1.56) (-0.76) 
Leverage -0.245*** -0.050*** 
 (-4.49) (-3.50) 
Log(Num. Bus. Seg.) -0.045*** -0.012*** 
 (-2.83) (-3.06) 
Log(Firm Age) 0.012 -0.000 
 (0.31) (-0.04) 
Return Volatility -0.119 -0.029 
 (-1.36) (-1.02) 
Log(Share Price) -0.042* -0.016*** 
 (-1.84) (-3.13) 
Book-to-market -0.144* 0.019 
 (-1.85) (0.94) 
Observations 1,849 1,849 
R-squared 0.594 0.558 
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Table 3 (cont’d) 
Panel B: Changes in Other Corporate Transparency Variables 
 
 
Change in 
Log(1+ 
Management 
Forecasts) 
Change in 
Management 
Forecast 
Precision 
Change in 
MDD 
Absolute 
Accruals 
Change in 
Log(1+ 
Number 
Analysts) 
Change in 
Analyst 
Consensus 
Change in 
Log(Inst. 
Holdings %) 
Change in 
Log(Number 
Shareholders) 
 
Log(Total 
Auditor Fees) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
∆% Indep. Directors 0.524** 0.728* 0.008 0.333* 1.202 0.053 -0.364 0.110 
  (predicted) (2.43) (1.66) (0.31) (1.73) (1.52) (1.18) (-1.06) (0.47) 
∆Log(Total Assets) 0.092** 0.120 -0.003 0.401*** 0.576*** 0.053*** 0.147** 0.569*** 
 (2.04) (1.05) (-0.83) (11.57) (3.03) (3.85) (2.12) (14.16) 
∆R&D -1.009 -1.473 -0.064 1.147** -2.847 -0.115 0.480 0.334 
 (-0.79) (-0.73) (-1.36) (2.12) (-1.40) (-0.84) (1.01) (0.53) 
∆Leverage 0.039 0.069 -0.003 -0.107 -0.056 -0.009 -0.134 -0.121 
 (0.37) (0.33) (-0.36) (-1.04) (-0.13) (-0.52) (-1.22) (-0.98) 
∆Log(Num. Bus. Seg.) -0.033 -0.078 0.004 -0.008 0.188 0.007 -0.067 0.137** 
 (-0.69) (-0.82) (1.24) (-0.35) (1.46) (0.84) (-1.04) (2.62) 
∆Log(Firm Age) 0.471** 1.263** -0.027** -0.288** -0.161 -0.000 -0.417* 0.493*** 
 (2.17) (2.65) (-2.34) (-2.13) (-0.25) (-0.01) (-1.78) (2.70) 
∆Return Volatility -0.043 0.091 0.016 0.148 -0.280 0.013 0.313 0.488*** 
 (-0.37) (0.29) (1.62) (1.01) (-0.42) (0.47) (1.17) (2.89) 
∆Log(Share Price) 0.199*** 0.328** 0.004 0.166*** 0.868*** 0.024* -0.099 -0.133*** 
 (3.59) (2.41) (0.65) (3.62) (3.87) (1.70) (-1.57) (-2.74) 
∆Book-to-market -0.034 -0.138 0.000 -0.180* -1.250** -0.047* -0.252 -0.607*** 
 (-0.18) (-0.34) (0.01) (-1.87) (-2.10) (-1.74) (-1.39) (-4.03) 
Log(Total Assets) -0.019 -0.043 -0.001 0.000 -0.033 0.000 0.046** 0.574*** 
 (-1.20) (-1.08) (-0.44) (0.01) (-0.57) (0.05) (2.27) (32.06) 
R&D 0.117 -0.351 0.065** 1.088*** 0.752 0.025 0.827 -0.427 
 (0.14) (-0.30) (2.32) (3.16) (0.49) (0.25) (1.65) (-1.00) 
Leverage 0.147* 0.285 0.003 -0.086 -0.018 0.023 0.106 0.269** 
 (1.71) (1.38) (0.35) (-1.08) (-0.05) (1.20) (0.93) (2.55) 
Log(Num. Bus. Seg.) -0.040 -0.068 -0.003 0.018 0.165 0.009 0.063* 0.189*** 
 (-0.92) (-0.76) (-1.39) (0.68) (1.39) (1.22) (1.72) (5.22) 
Log(Firm Age) 0.108 0.303** -0.001 -0.096** -0.010 -0.013 -0.176** 0.165*** 
 (1.57) (2.06) (-0.40) (-2.63) (-0.05) (-1.32) (-2.49) (2.72) 
Return Volatility -0.302** -0.304 -0.001 0.122 0.079 0.064 0.101 0.770*** 
 (-2.08) (-0.87) (-0.14) (0.68) (0.11) (1.55) (0.48) (4.64) 
Log(Share Price) 0.059* 0.149 0.007* -0.010 -0.108 0.002 -0.109** -0.022 
 (1.77) (1.55) (1.81) (-0.28) (-1.15) (0.21) (-2.24) (-0.80) 
Book-to-market -0.188 -0.286 0.014** -0.140* -0.626* 0.017 -0.291*** -0.387*** 
 (-1.44) (-0.88) (2.36) (-1.92) (-1.70) (0.97) (-2.86) (-3.81) 
Number of Obs. 1,849 1,849 1,428 1,849 1,849 1,849 1,655 1,839 
R-squared 0.126 0.072 0.092 0.340 0.223 0.171 0.057 0.754 
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Table 4 
Matched Pair Placebo Test 
This table presents the results of our matched pair placebo test. We match controlled firms, which were exempt from the exchanges’ board independence 
regulations, to non-compliant firms that were not exempt from the regulations, but were otherwise similar. We form matched pairs using propensity scores from a 
logistic regression of an indicator that equals one if the firm is exempt from the exchanges’ board independence requirements by virtue of being either foreign or 
controlled, and equals zero otherwise. We include as explanatory variables all of the variables in Eq. (1) above, one-digit SIC indicators, and the beginning 
(2000) values of the information variables. After eliminating firms for which adequate covariate balance could not be achieved across the two samples, we 
obtained 328 matched pairs of firms for which there were no significant differences in the mean of the propensity score variables across the two samples. The 
presents estimates from Eq. (6). Non-Exempt is one if the firm is not exempt from the regulations, and zero if the firm is exempt because it is controlled. The 
remaining variables are defined in the caption of Table 1. Industry fixed-effects for the 48 Fama and French (1997) industries and additional controls are included 
but not reported. t-statistics calculated based on robust standard errors clustered at the Fama and French (1997) industry level are reported in parentheses below 
the coefficient estimates. Statistical significance (two-sided) at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
∆% Indep. 
Directors 
Change in Log 
(IAC_Spread) 
Change in 
Log(1+ 
Management 
Forecasts) 
Change in 
Management 
Forecast 
Precision 
Change in 
MDD 
Absolute 
Accruals 
Change in 
Log(1+ 
Number 
Analysts) 
Change in 
Analyst 
Consensus 
Change in 
Log(Inst. 
Holdings %) 
Change in 
Log(Number 
Shareholders) 
Log(Total 
Auditor Fees) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Non-Exempt 0.030** -0.069** 0.034 0.012 -0.002 0.075** 0.266* 0.011 0.007 0.089* 
 (2.54) (-2.40) (0.72) (0.12) (-0.43) (2.04) (1.67) (1.04) (0.07) (1.68) 
Number of Obs. 656 656 656 656 489 656 656 656 573 651 
R-squared 0.318 0.766 0.434 0.406 0.145 0.512 0.464 0.378 0.066 0.664 
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Table 5 
Cross Sectional Relations Between Transparency and the Required Change in Independent Directors  
This table presents estimates from a modified second-stage regression of alternative measures of corporate transparency for the sample of non-controlled firms. 
Panel A presents estimates of Eq. (3) using Min. % Change ID. Panels B, C, D, and F present estimates from a modified version of Eq. (4) in which proxies for 
relatively high and low values of five variables are interacted with Min. % Change ID. Panel B uses audit committee independence in 2000 as a partition. Panels 
C and D divide IA_factor and % CEO App. ID into High and Low values according to whether they are above or below the sample median, respectively. Panel E 
divides Inside Ownership into High and Low values according to whether Inside Ownership is above or below 20%, respectively. Panel F uses decreases in board 
size as a partition. The remaining variables are defined in the caption of Table 1. Industry fixed-effects for the 48 Fama and French (1997) industries and 
additional controls are included but not reported. t-statistics calculated based on robust standard errors clustered at the Fama and French (1997) industry level are 
reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. Statistical significance (two-sided) at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are denoted by ***, **, and *, 
respectively. 
 
Panel A: Full Sample Estimates of Eq. (4) - Minimum Required Change 
 Change in Log 
(IAC_Spread) 
Change in 
Log(1+ 
Management 
Forecasts) 
Change in 
Management 
Forecast 
Precision 
Change in 
MDD 
Absolute 
Accruals 
Change in 
Log(1+ 
Number 
Analysts) 
Change in 
Analyst 
Consensus 
Change in 
Log(Inst. 
Holdings %) 
Change in 
Log(Number 
Shareholders) 
 
 
Log(Total 
Auditor Fees) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Min. % Change ID -0.228** 0.332** 0.461 0.005 0.211* 0.761 0.034 -0.230 0.095 
 (-2.64) (2.43) (1.66) (0.31) (1.73) (1.52) (1.18) (-1.06) (0.72) 
Number of Obs. 1,849 1,849 1,849 1,428 1,849 1,849 1,849 1,655 1,836 
R-squared 0.594 0.126 0.072 0.092 0.340 0.223 0.171 0.057 0.760 
 
Panel B: Audit Committee Composition Interaction 
 Change in Log 
(IAC_Spread) 
Change in 
Log(1+ 
Management 
Forecasts) 
Change in 
Management 
Forecast 
Precision 
Change in 
MDD 
Absolute 
Accruals 
Change in 
Log(1+ 
Number 
Analysts) 
Change in 
Analyst 
Consensus 
Change in 
Log(Inst. 
Holdings %) 
Change in 
Log(Number 
Shareholders) 
 
 
Log(Total 
Auditor Fees) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Min. % Change ID x -0.003 0.235 -0.175 0.031 -0.070 -0.033 0.059 0.032 -0.277 
    Audit Committee Indep. (-0.02) (0.66) (-0.30) (1.05) (-0.43) (-0.03) (1.16) (0.08) (-0.90) 
Min. % Change ID x  -0.330*** 0.336** 0.670** -0.002 0.263* 1.040** 0.034 -0.315 0.221 
    Audit Committee Not Indep. (-3.50) (2.18) (2.13) (-0.11) (1.66) (2.04) (1.05) (-1.19) (1.64) 
Indep.vs. Not Indep. -0.328** 0.101 0.845 -0.0328 0.333 1.073 -0.0244 -0.348 0.498 
t-stat (-2.21) (0.26) (1.25) (-1.28) (1.44) (0.92) (-0.41) (-0.71) (1.57) 
Number of Obs. 1,849 1,849 1,849 1,428 1,849 1,849 1,849 1,655 1,836 
R-squared 0.595 0.126 0.073 0.093 0.341 0.223 0.171 0.057 0.761 
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Table 5 (cont’d) 
 
Panel C: Information Processing Costs Interaction 
 Change in Log 
(IAC_Spread) 
Change in 
Log(1+ 
Management 
Forecasts) 
Change in 
Management 
Forecast 
Precision 
Change in 
MDD 
Absolute 
Accruals 
Change in 
Log(1+ 
Number 
Analysts) 
Change in 
Analyst 
Consensus 
Change in 
Log(Inst. 
Holdings %) 
Change in 
Log(Number 
Shareholders) 
 
 
Log(Total 
Auditor Fees) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Min. % Change ID x -0.113 0.286 0.083 0.015 0.543** 1.481 -0.001 0.571 -0.170 
    Low IA_factor (-0.75) (1.32) (0.12) (0.72) (2.19) (1.34) (-0.01) (1.38) (-0.60) 
Min. % Change ID x  -0.284*** 0.356** 0.591* 0.002 0.094 0.403 0.051 -0.498* 0.221 
   High IA_factor (-2.74) (2.06) (1.99) (0.09) (0.75) (0.86) (1.23) (-1.86) (1.63) 
High vs. Low 0.171 -0.0696 -0.509 0.0127 0.450* 1.078 -0.0516 1.069*** -0.391 
t-stat (1.01) (-0.26) (-0.68) (0.37) (1.84) (0.97) (-0.65) (2.51) (-1.35) 
Number of Obs. 1,849 1,849 1,849 1,428 1,849 1,849 1,849 1,655 1,836 
R-squared 0.594 0.125 0.073 0.092 0.342 0.224 0.170 0.055 0.758 
 
 
Panel D: Independent Directors Appointed by CEO Interaction 
 Change in Log 
(IAC_Spread) 
Change in 
Log(1+ 
Management 
Forecasts) 
Change in 
Management 
Forecast 
Precision 
Change in 
MDD 
Absolute 
Accruals 
Change in 
Log(1+ 
Number 
Analysts) 
Change in 
Analyst 
Consensus 
Change in 
Log(Inst. 
Holdings %) 
Change in 
Log(Number 
Shareholders) 
 
 
Log(Total 
Auditor Fees) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Min. % Change ID x  -0.256* 0.639*** 1.729*** 0.023 0.084 0.477 0.012 -0.193 0.194 
    Low % CEO App. ID (-1.76) (2.95) (3.64) (1.21) (0.63) (0.57) (0.22) (-0.67) (0.77) 
Min. % Change ID x  -0.189 0.135 -0.480 -0.017 0.247 1.067 0.066** -0.052 0.106 
    High % CEO App. ID (-1.51) (0.57) (-1.03) (-0.84) (1.18) (1.33) (2.03) (-0.16) (0.55) 
High vs. Low -0.0667 0.505 2.210*** 0.0403 -0.162 -0.590 -0.0535 -0.141 0.0879 
t-stat (-0.31) (1.43) (2.96) (1.61) (-0.63) (-0.47) (-0.80) (-0.33) (0.26) 
Number of Obs. 1,805 1,805 1,805 1,397 1,805 1,805 1,805 1,622 1,793 
R-squared 0.592 0.128 0.077 0.096 0.343 0.218 0.172 0.054 0.754 
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Table 5 (cont’d) 
 
Panel E: Inside Ownership Interaction 
 Change in Log 
(IAC_Spread) 
Change in 
Log(1+ 
Management 
Forecasts) 
Change in 
Management 
Forecast 
Precision 
Change in 
MDD 
Absolute 
Accruals 
Change in 
Log(1+ 
Number 
Analysts) 
Change in 
Analyst 
Consensus 
Change in 
Log(Inst. 
Holdings %) 
Change in 
Log(Number 
Shareholders) 
 
 
Log(Total 
Auditor Fees) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Min. % Change ID x  -0.237* 0.599** 1.483** 0.001 0.160 0.582 0.028 -0.164 0.191 
    Low Inside Ownership (-1.91) (2.15) (2.66) (0.04) (0.88) (0.66) (0.76) (-0.47) (0.90) 
Min. % Change ID x  -0.076 0.057 -0.624 0.022 0.297 0.529 0.022 -0.448* 0.184 
    High Inside Ownership (-0.57) (0.38) (-1.58) (1.00) (1.59) (0.87) (0.44) (-1.66) (1.36) 
High vs. Low -0.161 0.542 2.107*** -0.0209 -0.137 0.0523 0.00625 0.284 0.00697 
t-stat (-0.89) (1.62) (2.74) (-0.74) (-0.60) (0.05) (0.10) (0.78) (0.03) 
Number of Obs. 1,849 1,849 1,849 1,428 1,849 1,849 1,849 1,655 1,836 
R-squared 0.597 0.127 0.076 0.095 0.340 0.224 0.170 0.054 0.758 
 
Panel F: Decrease in Board Size Interaction 
 Change in Log 
(IAC_Spread) 
Change in 
Log(1+ 
Management 
Forecasts) 
Change in 
Management 
Forecast 
Precision 
Change in 
MDD 
Absolute 
Accruals 
Change in 
Log(1+ 
Number 
Analysts) 
Change in 
Analyst 
Consensus 
Change in 
Log(Inst. 
Holdings %) 
Change in 
Log(Number 
Shareholders) 
 
 
Log(Total 
Auditor Fees) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Min. % Change ID x  0.331 1.254* 2.084 -0.009 -0.003 0.954 -0.007 -0.054 -0.195 
    Board Size Down (1.29) (1.84) (1.30) (-0.28) (-0.01) (0.54) (-0.07) (-0.07) (-0.43) 
Min. % Change ID x  -0.333*** 0.239 0.412 0.006 0.195 0.445 0.028 -0.268 0.262* 
    Board Size Up (-2.91) (1.33) (1.43) (0.38) (1.49) (0.93) (0.90) (-1.04) (1.97) 
Down vs. Up -0.664** -1.015 -1.672 0.0153 0.198 -0.509 0.0348 -0.214 0.457 
t-stat (-2.22) (-1.38) (-0.99) (0.42) (0.49) (-0.29) (0.34) (-0.28) (0.96) 
Number of Obs. 1,849 1,849 1,849 1,428 1,849 1,849 1,849 1,655 1,836 
R-squared 0.595 0.127 0.073 0.092 0.341 0.223 0.168 0.052 0.757 
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Table 6 
Changes in Transparency: Relation with Timing of Board Changes  
This table presents coefficient estimates on Min %  Change ID for the full sample period (2000 to 2004), the first half of the sample period (2000 to 2002), and the 
ratio of the two coefficient estimates. Variables are defined in the caption of Table 1. Industry fixed-effects for the 48 Fama and French (1997) industries and 
additional controls are included but not reported. t-statistics (untabulated) are calculated based on robust standard errors clustered at the Fama and French (1997) 
industry level. Statistical significance (two-sided) at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.  
Panel A 
 Change in Log 
(IAC_Spread) 
Change in 
Log(1+ 
Management 
Forecasts) 
Change in 
Management 
Forecast 
Precision 
Change in 
MDD Absolute 
Accruals 
Change in 
Log(1+ 
Number 
Analysts) 
Change in 
Analyst 
Consensus 
Change in 
Log(Inst. 
Holdings %) 
Change in 
Log(Number 
Shareholders) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
2000 to 2004    
   Min %  Change ID -0.222** 0.351** 0.451 0.792 0.209* -0.002 0.045 -0.213 
2000 to 2002         
   Min %  Change ID -0.170 0.242* 0.780** 0.753** 0.221** -0.004 0.034 0.033 
Ratio of Coefficients         
   First Half/Full Period 0.77 0.69 1.73* 0.95 1.06* 2.00 0.76 -0.15 
Panel B 
 Change in Log 
(IAC_Spread) 
Change in 
Log(1+ 
Management 
Forecasts) 
Change in 
Management 
Forecast 
Precision 
Change in 
MDD 
Absolute 
Accruals 
Change in 
Log(1+ 
Number 
Analysts) 
Change in 
Analyst 
Consensus 
Change in 
Log(Inst. 
Holdings %) 
Change in 
Log(Number 
Shareholders) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
2000 to 2004  
   Min. % Change IDxCompliant Early -0.363*** 0.665** 0.879 0.959 0.342 -0.019 0.036 0.392 
   Min. % Change IDxCompliant Late -0.158 0.207* 0.254 0.715 0.148 0.008 0.050 -0.490 
2000 to 2002  
   Min. % Change IDxCompliant Early -0.109 0.397 1.104* 0.210 0.194 -0.008 0.014 0.445 
   Min. % Change IDxCompliant Late -0.198 0.171 0.632 1.003** 0.233* -0.001 0.043 -0.157 
Ratio of Coefficients: (First Half/Full Period) 
   Min. % Change IDxCompliant Early 0.30 0.60 1.26 0.22 0.57 0.42 0.39 1.14 
   Min. % Change IDxCompliant Late 1.25 0.83 2.49 1.40* 1.57* -0.13 0.86 0.32 
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Figure 1 
Timeline of Sample Alignment 
 
                                              “2000 starting period”  “2004 ending period” 
 
Annual Meeting Dates 10/99                  12/00 2003 Regulations 11/03                10/04 
 
Fiscal year-ends 5/00                      6/01  5/04                     6/05 
 
